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




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**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

21 August 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence  
FROM : John N. McMahon  
Deputy Director for Operations  
SUBJECT :  Report

1. Enclosed is a  report. For convenience of reference by NFIB agencies, the codeword  has been assigned to the product of certain extremely sensitive agent sources of CIA's Directorate of Operations. The word  is classified  and is to be used only among persons authorized to read and handle this material.

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


*JN* John N. McMahon

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## Intelligence Information Special Report

COUNTRY Poland/Warsaw Pact



DATE OF  
INFO. March 1980

DATE 21 August 1980

SUBJECT

Operational Planning in Warsaw Pact Combined Armed Forces

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

This report is a translation of a Russian-language document, classified TOP SECRET, entitled "Operational Issues to be Defined More Precisely by the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces." It is a Polish request to the Soviet Armed Forces General Staff for clarification of methods and forms of Warsaw Pact operations plans. Questions are raised on the role of the Combined Armed Forces Staff, and the extent of coordination between the General Staffs of the Polish and Soviet Armed Forces and the Combined Armed Forces. Opinions are requested on questions concerning command and control, storage of ammunition, and the basing of Polish Armed Forces aircraft in East Germany.

End of Summary

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OPERATIONAL ISSUES  
to be Defined More Precisely by the  
General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces

March 1980

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1. The General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces--in accordance with the decisions of the "Statute on the Combined Armed Forces of Warsaw Pact Member States and Its Leadership Organs in Wartime," articles 10 and 11--performs functions of the working organ of the Supreme High Command, and is responsible for training forces assigned to the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states.

The above-mentioned document in article 17 also entrusts the Staff of Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact with certain responsibilities in the area of the theater of military operations.

In connection with this, the role of the Staff of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Member States has been increased.

We are interested in the following:

- what changes have been envisioned in methods and forms of operations planning;

- what role and place have been planned for the Staff of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states within the operations planning process and also the extent of coordination between the General Staffs of the Polish and Soviet Armed Forces and with the Combined Armed Forces in peacetime as well as wartime.

2. During the course of exercises of the General Staffs, conducted by the Commander in Chief, the issue of assigning troops to the Combined Armed Forces in the theater of military operations had been worked up. On one occasion it had been decided that it is to be at the moment of introduction of the combat readiness--THREAT OF WAR, whereas in another case it was to be at FULL COMBAT READINESS. We would like to know the opinions of the Main Operations Directorate of the Soviet Armed Forces General Staff.

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3. We have compiled suggestions and a plan for providing support for the allied forces' regrouping over the Polish People's Republic territory.

Experience teaches us that we ought to introduce specific changes which, in particular, concern the following:

- command and control, which, on an operational scale, can be more expediently decided by the Polish Armed Forces General Staff team in the military district, bypassing the present Central Groups No. 1 and 2;

- allocation of routes assigned for front's regrouping in connection with the needs of the Polish front as well as resolving the issue of rebasing front and army aviation.

4. The organization and order of deliveries of special ammunition in wartime for Polish Armed Forces rocket troops and aviation have not yet been decided. Recommendations regarding the issue would be welcome in view of tactical and special training of certain command authorities, and also in order to define operations planning principles indispensable for ensuring this process.



5. Experience shows that conducting front operations on two separate operational axes is very complicated from the point of troop command and control as well as fire support and material-technical support. The scope of operational tasks for the Polish front should be examined.

6. What is the opinion of the Soviet Armed Forces General Staff in regard to constructing protected command posts for ground forces and aviation groupings on the territory of the Polish Peoples Republic and at the departure area (GDR)?

In our opinion, front and army alternate command posts (of field type in training areas) should only be prepared within the Polish People's Republic, since control points and forces assigned to the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact carry out a regrouping in departure areas located on GDR territory.

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7. In the framework of preparing the departure area for the Polish Armed Forces front on GDR territory, it would be advisable to store there well in advance a specified amount of ammunition (about 8,000 tons). How would it be possible to better resolve this issue?

8. Prior to each new five-year plan, we used to receive from the Soviet Armed Forces General Staff suggestions in regard to the communications system. How will it be this year?

9. When working up the new five-year development plan for the Polish Armed Forces, the Commander in Chief of the Warsaw Pact Combined Forces, in his recommendations, proposes organizing a front air force instead of an air army. We have decided to accept in principle these proposals and to test them during our planned [SPRING-80] exercise. In this connection we ask you to clarify the following:


a) the role and place of the front air force in offensive operations, and also the methods of planning and conducting combat operations;

b) planning and conducting air operations in the theater of military operations in accordance with new views, and the order of task changes for the Polish Armed Forces front air force in the operations plan;

c) in the present operations plan nine airfields are allocated for the front air force, including three airfields for joint basing with the 16th Fighter Division (Soviet Armed Forces). Some of them do not provide conditions for basing modern supersonic aircraft of the SU and MIG types. In this connection it would be advisable to review the issue of basing at airfields of the GDR National People's Army.

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d) in connection with the projected participation of the front air force in air operations in the theater of military operations, the necessity arises of fueling and supplying weapons for aircraft for successive flights. We feel that it would be advisable to review jointly the possibility of ensuring aircraft spare parts needs in the area of flight control and material-technical services, since the rear services establishments and front air force units will be regrouping at that time.

10. Navy issues

In connection with the "Statute...(Chapter 4)" which envisions the creation of a Combined Baltic Fleet for wartime, the necessity of a new definition arises in the following:

a) the role and place of the Polish Navy in naval operations within the Combined Baltic Fleet and also methods of planning and conducting combat actions;

b) the role and place of the Staff of Combined Armed Forces (Staff of the Combined Baltic Fleet) in the operations planning process, and also the extent of coordination between the General Staffs of the Soviet and Polish Armed Forces on one hand, and the Staffs of the Combined Armed Forces and the Combined Baltic Fleet on the other--in peacetime as well as in wartime.

11. The operations plan for the Polish Armed Forces, of which there is one copy at the Main Operations Directorate, should be a "living thing," because of changes in organizational structure, deployment, and views in regard to conducting combat operations, be they our own or the enemy's.

In view of this it would be advisable to submit clarifications at least once a year. What is your opinion? What kind of a method for updating operations plan documents will be accepted?

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